

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACTS SECTION

COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: BLACK BAG OPERATIONS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT #

2

Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice

510 South Spring Street, Room 900
Los Angeles 13, California

September 30, 1947

DIRECTOR, FBI

SPECIAL DELIVERY
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re: [REDACTED]

INTERNAL SECURITY - C - HUNGARIAN

Dear Sir:

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated August 28, 1947 requesting information concerning the identity of several Los Angeles Division confidential informants for the purpose of determining whether or not these informants or the information which they furnished this office might be made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service in connection with the above captioned subject's petition for U. S. citizenship.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE



CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-11-90

COPY DESTROYED

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JUL 17 1949

RECORDED

INDEXED

100-224162

OCT 2 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

September 30, 1947

Re

INTERNAL SECURITY - C - HUNGARIAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/s
(41)
(42)
(71C)
(71D)
With regard to the information concerning the subject set forth in the report of SA [redacted] dated February 1, 1946 at Los Angeles, California in this case, entitled "American Youth for Democracy - Internal Security - C" the Los Angeles Division obtained this information from [redacted]. The lists of the committees for the dinner appeared on letters distributed to interested persons, announcing the event, however the Los Angeles Division has been unable to locate any other source from which this same information could be produced or to which the Immigration and Naturalization Service could be referred. The material was obtained by [redacted].

(41)
(42)
(71C)
(71D)
Los Angeles, and therefore it is not believed that it would be advisable to furnish this information to the U. S. Attorney for his use in connection with this naturalization proceedings. (u)

CONFIDENTIAL
[redacted] who furnished the information attributed to [redacted] in the report of SA [redacted] dated December 26, 1944 in Los Angeles, California in the case entitled "American Youth for Democracy - Internal Security - C", was [redacted] Arcade Building, 542 South Broadway, Los Angeles [redacted] afforded Agents of the Los Angeles Division admission to the American Youth for Democracy offices in the Arcade Building in connection with a "black bag" job performed at that location. [redacted] himself has no knowledge of the nature of the activities which were conducted in that office by Bureau Agents therefore could not testify concerning any of the material photographed in connection with this entry. The documents obtained through this "black bag" job could not be made available for the use of the United States Attorney. (u)

0/s [redacted]
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOCUMENT #

The Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Director, FBI

October 20, 1947

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated September 24, 1947 and to your memorandum dated July 24, 1947, your file reference [redacted] and [redacted]

This is to advise you that the confidential source of information which was furnished to you in my memorandum dated February 27, 1947, page 4, paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 has been contacted by this Bureau. This informant stated that [redacted]

With regard to certain literature concerning the affairs of the American Youth for Democracy, it is not possible at the present time to use this information, since it was originally obtained from a highly reliable confidential source whose identity cannot be disclosed. (u)

The Los Angeles Field Division of this Bureau does not have, at the present, any additional information of value concerning [redacted] and his associations with the Communist Party. At the present time there is no source of information available who could furnish specific information concerning the Communist activities on the part of [redacted] for your purposes with regard to [redacted] naturalization.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAILED 10

★ OCT 21 1947 P.M.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

100-224162-6
68 NOV 28 1947
Tolson
E. A. Tamm
Clegg
Glavin
Ladd
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Egan
Gurnea
Harbo
Mohr
Pennington
Quinn
Tele. Room
Holloman
Nease
Gandy

Classified by 100-224162-6
Declassify on: OADR 10/22/87
20460
comp.

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-11-90

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OTHERWISE

68 NOV 28 1947

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson ☒
DeLoach ☒
Mohr ☒
Bishop ☒
Casper ☒
Callahan ☒
Conrad ☒
Felt ☒
Gale ☒
Rosen ☒
Sullivan ☒
Tavel ☒
Trotter ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

DATE:

July 19, 1966

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

~~DO NOT FILE~~

SUBJECT: "BLACK BAG" JOBS

Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Sullivan

The following is set forth in regard to your request concerning what authority we have for "black bag" jobs and for the background of our policy and procedures in such matters.

We do not obtain authorization for "black bag" jobs from outside the Bureau. Such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, "black bag" jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable technique in combating subversive activities of a clandestine nature aimed directly at undermining and destroying our nation.

The present procedure followed in the use of this technique calls for the Special Agent in Charge of a field office to make his request for the use of the technique to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Agent in Charge must completely justify the need for the use of the technique and at the same time assure that it can be safely used without any danger or embarrassment to the Bureau. The facts are incorporated in a memorandum which, in accordance with the Director's instructions, is sent to Mr. Tolson or to the Director for approval. Subsequently this memorandum is filed in the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File" procedure.

In the field the Special Agent in Charge prepares an informal memorandum showing that he obtained Bureau authority and this memorandum is filed in his safe until the next inspection by Bureau Inspectors, at which time it is destroyed.

[REDACTED]

Classified By 12

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTINUED

OVER

Exempt from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ALL (6/11)

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
Re: "BLACK BAG" JOBS

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Also through the use of this technique we have on numerous occasions been able to obtain material held highly secret and closely guarded by subversive groups and organizations which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists of these organizations.

This applies even to our investigation of the Ku Klux Klan. You may recall that recently through a "black bag" job we obtained the records in the possession of three high-ranking officials of a klan organization in Louisiana. These records gave us the complete membership and financial information concerning the klan's operation which we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization and, in fact, to bring about its near disintegration.

It was through information obtained through our "black bag" operations that we obtained the basic information used to compromise and to bring about the expulsion of William Albertson, the former Executive Secretary of the Communist Party New York District organization.

[REDACTED]


~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTINUED -- OVER

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
re: "BLACK BAG" JOBS

(6/11)

 (S)
In short, it is a very valuable weapon which we have used to combat the highly clandestine efforts of subversive elements seeking to undermine our Nation.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information.

~~SECRET~~

*No more such techniques
must be used.*
ch

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

January 8, 1967

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. DE LOACH

I note that requests are still being made by Bureau officials for the use of "black bar" techniques. I have previously indicated that I do not intend to approve any such requests in the future, and, consequently, no such recommendations should be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes also surreptitious entrances upon premises of any kind, will not meet with my approval in the future.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

DECLASSIFIED BY SPURM/cal
ON 3-7-82

JEH:EDM (7)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by 12
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Felt	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Gale	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Walters	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

John N. Mitchell
On March 29, 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney General, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Admiral Noel A. Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency. (u)

This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and foreign.

[REDACTED] There was some discussion upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail. (u) *CD 3u*

I stated to the Attorney General, Mr. Helms, and Admiral Gaylor that I was not at all enthusiastic about such an extension of operations insofar as the FBI was concerned in view of the hazards involved. The Attorney General stated that he thought before he could make any final decision in this matter, Mr. Helms should make an in-depth examination of exactly what he and Admiral Gaylor desired and then submit to the Attorney General and myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would call another meeting of this particular group and make the decision as to what could or could not be done. (u)

Mr. Helms said he would take care of this very promptly. (u)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:EDM (1)

CLASSIFIED BY 1482 *6/28/78*
EXEMPT FROM GDS CATEGORY 2, 3
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION INDEFINITE

~~TOP SECRET~~

0690 Doc 2

(CDU) FBI

PART 1

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT # 3

Classified by 1563 TOP SECRET - COMINT

Declassify on: OADR 6-14-84 (7/10)
APPROX 87 2172

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams

July 25, 1975

Director, FBI

Surreptitious Entries

SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY

- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Fulton

Classified by SPKELW/col
Declassify on: OADR 5/20/83

"The New York Times" of July 21, 1975, contained an article in which it quoted from the latest issue of Newsweek magazine which reported that FBI Agents broke into an average of one foreign embassy a month in recent years. The article indicated the FBI conducted about 1,500 break-ins of embassies and missions, criminal hide-outs and headquarters of extremist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA). The embassy break-ins were described as having been usually staged to obtain information to help the National Security Agency break foreign codes.

Enclosed for information are the original and one copy of three letterhead memoranda, dated July 25, 1975, dealing with surreptitious entries conducted by the Bureau in the field of national security. These letterhead memoranda are as follows:

- 1) Letterhead memorandum captioned "Surreptitious Entry," which deals with procedures for approvals and operations; operations against 10 domestic targets which occurred prior to 1967; operations against 11 foreign intelligence targets prior to 1967; discontinuance of operations by Director J. Edgar Hoover, July, 1966, which he reaffirmed in January, 1967; and surreptitious entries as they relate to authorized microphone installations.
- 2) Letterhead memorandum captioned [redacted] which sets forth details regarding surreptitious entry [redacted] conducted by this Bureau in 1971 on specific written instructions of then Attorney General John N. Mitchell.
- 3) Letterhead memorandum captioned "Surreptitious Entry" [redacted]

[redacted] by the FBI from 1954 to 1967. Attached to this letterhead memorandum is a "Communications Intelligence Organizational Chart."

ENCLOSURE

TOP SECRET - COMINT

HANDLE VIA COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS

Classified by Director, FBI

Exempt from GDS Categories 2 and 3

Date of Declassification Indefinite

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED

BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)

DATE: 7-11-90

8-4-88 Class. & Ext.

REASON-FCIM, 1-2.4.2.3

DATE OF REVIEW

WHEN SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SPU J. J. J.

1-2-82-93

7-26-93

- Asst. Dir.:
- Adm. Serv.
- Comp. Syst.
- Ext. Affairs
- Files & Com.
- Gen. Inv.
- Ident.
- Insp.
- Intell.
- Laboratory
- Plan. & Eval.
- Spec. Inv.
- Training
- Legal Coun.
- Telephone Rm.
- Director Sec'y

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~

The Attorney General

"The New York Times" article stated that the FBI blocked a New York City police inquiry into a break-in into the apartment of a Soviet diplomat assigned to the United Nations. On the basis of the facts as presented in the account, the FBI is unable to identify the incident. (u)

(7)(c)
(6)(1)
Additionally, "The New York Times" article, quoting Newsweek, reported the FBI had broken into the Czechoslovak Embassy, Washington, D. C., and stolen a coding machine. For your information, on July 25, 1959, [redacted] Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C., overtly defected to the United States. [redacted]

While the FBI was aware of [redacted] intention to defect, and was on the scene outside the Embassy to assist him and his family with regard to personal security, the FBI did not at any time during this period enter or "break in" the Czech Embassy. (u)

For your convenience, I am also enclosing a copy of "The New York Times" article dated July 21, 1975, and a copy of the article which appeared in the July 28, 1975, edition of Newsweek.

Enclosures - 9

1 - The Deputy Attorney General (Enclosures - 6)

NOTE:

(u)(x) This is to furnish the Attorney General for his information details of surreptitious entry by this Bureau in the intelligence field in view of revelations set out in "The New York Times" and Newsweek magazine. Newsweek article which became available on 7/22/75 also alleged surreptitious entries involving organized crime matters. This has been called to the attention of Special Investigative Division which is researching the matter and will prepare a separate paper regarding the allegations for the Attorney General.

~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~

~~SECRET~~

F.B.I. Embassy Break-Ins Put at One-a-Month Rate

NY Times
July 21, 1975

By [illegible]

Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation broke into an entire coding machine and a truckload of files average of one foreign embassy from the Czechoslovak Embassy a month in recent years. Newsweek in Washington about 15 week magazine reports in its years ago, and were so excited latest issue. In one Arab mission they met Israeli agents. The F.B.I. filmed the result already there, saluted and from a concealed observation walked away, the magazine point the next morning. Newsweek says.

Newsweek says that F.B.I. agents broke into the embassies of Arab countries, Poland, Yugoslavia, France and Japan, stole a coding machine from the Czechoslovak Embassy and blocked a New York City police inquiry into a break-in at the apartment of a Soviet diplomat assigned to the United Nations. "One of the funniest things you'd ever see was the film of the Czech deputy chief of security going to the Soviet Embassy with his hat in his hand," Newsweek quoted one source as having said. "The Czechs couldn't even wire Prague to tell them what had happened. They had to go to the Soviet Embassy and use the Soviet machines."

The magazine quotes Justice Department and present and former F.B.I. employees as the source of its information.

The bureau conducted about 1,500 break-ins of embassies and missions, criminal hideouts and headquarters of extremist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan and the American Communist party, the Newsweek articles says.

"Embassy break-ins, averaging one a month by one estimate, were usually staged to get information that could help the National Security Agency break foreign codes," it adds.

The magazine says the agents were organized into groups known as "black-bag teams" or "black-bag boys."

They dressed in suits and ties but did not carry guns, badges or credentials, the article adds and quotes a former agent as having said the agents had been told, "If you get caught, you're on your own."

The teams consisted of a Jocksmith, a lookout and one or two men to carry out the searches. Newsweek reports and adds that sometimes a "slugger" was sent along to intercept anyone who might discover a break-in while it was in progress.

Two sources reported, the article says that F.B.I. agents posing as garbage collectors has been in office.

F.B.I. Declines to Comment

SPECIAL TO THE NEW YORK TIMES

WASHINGTON, July 20—An F.B.I. spokesman, Homer Boynton, said the bureau had "no comment" on the report of F.B.I. break-ins at embassies and missions.

Mr. Boynton said he could not add anything to the statement by the F.B.I. director, Clarence M. Kelley, at a news conference last week that the agency had in the past made "surreptitious entries" into various places, including embassies, since World War II.

All the information on the burglaries is being transferred to the Attorney General and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Mr. Boynton said.

Mr. Kelley said that the bureau's agents had committed the break-ins and burglaries to obtain "information relative to the security of the nation."

He added that "there were a few" such break-ins at embassies here after 1966 — the year that F.B.I. sources have previously given for the termination of the practice by J. Edgar Hoover, the bureau's late director.

Mr. Kelley said that he had not been asked to approve any break-ins in the two years he

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DATE 3-3-88 BY SP5CEN/col

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66-8768-2722

ENCLOSURE

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

President ordered an end to the controls that have kept the price of domestic "old oil"—generally from wells in operation before 1973—at an artificially low \$5.25 per barrel. Instead of the immediate and total decontrol he had once envisioned, however, Ford proposed a gradual phasing out of price controls over the next two and a half years. Eventually, all old oil—about 60 per cent of domestic production—would join "new oil" in following the world market price. But Ford conceded that there should be some limit; he proposed a domestic ceiling of \$13.50 per barrel.

Nipples: Ford's concessions on the question of a ceiling and on the need for gradual decontrol hinted plainly at compromise and thus were probably the most significant parts of his order, but critics preferred to focus initially on the plan's specific economic impact. The President said only that his proposal would add 1 cent to the price of each gallon of gasoline during the first year and a total of 7 cents in 30 months. But consumer advocate Ralph Nader warned of a far-reaching "ripple effect" inflating the economy. Some experts in Congress cited a computer projection warning that 800,000 more Americans would be unemployed, the gross national product would be cut by \$40 billion and consumer prices would be raised by 3.2 per cent.

Despite last-minute maneuvering, Ford apparently couldn't raise enough support to keep Congress from killing his decontrol plan this week. But he did have the votes to sustain his veto of a bill passed last week that would tighten controls on old oil and roll back new-oil prices to \$11.28 per barrel. Ford also pledged to veto a backup plan for simply extending current controls to March 1. To avoid the instant skyrocketing of prices, however, both sides may well agree to a briefer extension.

That would provide time for a more comprehensive compromise, and some of its features already seemed plain. One key House committee was considering a phased decontrol of oil, similar to Ford's plan but with a lower ceiling price. A consensus was also building on some sort of windfall-profits tax for oil companies, mandatory mileage standards for new automobiles, the creation of a strategic oil reserve—and a multimillion-dollar trust fund to help find new ways of keeping up with the nation's need for energy.

—DAVID M. ALPERIN with HENRY W. HUBBARD and THOMAS M. DUFFRANK in Washington

The FBI's 'Black-Bag Boys'

Every foreign intelligence agent had suspected it and every major mafioso had known for sure, but last week director Clarence Kelley made it official: the FBI, he reported, has in the past made "surprised entries" into various places, foreign embassies included, to obtain what it felt was important information. Kelley said the break-ins began during World War II and were largely discontinued by J. Edgar Hoover in 1966, and he implied they were legal because the agents "acted in good faith." But the disclosure touched off a major furor: Attorney General Edward Levi promised a criminal investigation, several foreign

former agent who said he had taken part in many break-ins. "You were told, 'If you get caught, you're on your own.' They were known as 'black-bag teams' or 'black-bag boys' and they usually consisted—at a minimum—of a locksmith, a lookout and a couple of men to do the ransacking. Depending on the purpose of the break-in, one of them would know how to use a camera or install a bug. Sometimes a 'slugger' was sent along to intercept unexpected visitors. 'We had guys who, if they went bad, would be the best second-story men in the world,' boasted one former agent.

Over the years, a Justice Department official told NEWSWEEK's Stephan Leshar, the FBI conducted about 1,500 break-ins of foreign embassies and missions, mob hangouts and the headquarters of such extremist groups as the Ku Klux Klan and the American Communist Party. Embassy break-ins, averaging one a month by one estimate, were usually staged to get information that could help the National Security Agency break foreign codes.

Bugs: One top source said last week that he never knew of a case in which the FBI planted a bug in an embassy; if the code were cracked, no bug would be needed anyway and, besides, a diplomatic bug was almost sure to be found. But break-ins against organized-crime figures and U.S. Communists were almost always to plant bugs. "They had bugs in mob apartments all over New York," said one government investigator.

A break-in at a mob office in Brooklyn, for example, might employ only a lookout, a driver for a getaway car and a couple of agents. But a break-in at a major embassy or mission would require not only a skilled team, but dozens of agents to fan out across



Illustration by Sam Hunter

Surprised by Soviet official, the 'slugger' goes to work

ambassadors called the White House to learn whether they had been targets, and Presidential counsel Philip Buchen berated Levi for not keeping Kelley "on a shorter leash." Most intriguingly, the director's disclosure also set other tongues wagging. NEWSWEEK's Anthony Marro pieced together this story of the FBI's after-hours adventures:

The FBI agents usually went in clean. No badge, no guns, no credentials. Almost always they wore the standard uniform of suit and tie, but with labels and cleaner markings removed. "It was your ass if you got caught," recalled a

the city and watch all of the 50 to 60 persons known to have keys to the building. The agents who entered usually would take in sensitive cameras (capable of taking pictures without a flash) and small copying machines that could be folded into a suitcase. They wouldn't read anything," said one FBI source. "They just copy everything in sight." The agents would photograph the coding machine from every possible angle, then copy messages and replace the originals. The idea was that the National Security Agency would have intercepted incoming coded messages and the FBI would have decoded copies. That, plus the



Czech defector slips coding machine to 'garbagemen'

photographs, might enable the NSA to break the code.

Two sources said that the FBI actually smuggled out an entire coding machine about fifteen years ago. Borrowing a truck and uniforms from a garbage-collection company, agents drove into the yard of the Czech Embassy in Washington and waited near an open window, through which a Czech defector passed not only the machine but nearly a truckload of files. "They were so excited that they forgot to pick up the garbage," said one source. The next morning, the FBI filmed the results from a hide-out. "One of the funniest things you'd ever see," the source said, "was the film of the Czech deputy chief of security going to the Soviet Embassy with his hat in his hand. The Czechs couldn't even wire Prague to tell them what had happened. They had to go to the Soviet Embassy and use the Soviet machines."

Salute: This same source and another agreed that in the late 1950s and early 1960s the FBI also broke into the Polish and Yugoslav embassies in Washington. At least three separate bureau sources agreed that there was "no way" for agents to penetrate the Soviet Embassy, so instead they targeted Soviet satellite countries. Even allies, such as France or Japan, were occasional targets, as were the Arab states. "All the Arab embassies were easy," said one bureau source. "The only problem was tripping over the Israelis already inside." He said that in at least one case FBI agents breaking into an Arab mission found themselves face to face with Israeli agents. What happens in such cases? "You salute each other and walk away," the source said. "Nobody wants any trouble."

There were enough problems as it was. Once, in a mob headquarters in the Midwest, an agent planting a microphone slipped on a joist in the attic and thrust his foot through the ceiling of the room below. The agents had to wake up

the owner of a hardware store and get plaster to repair the ceiling before dawn. During the late 1950s, two sources said, an agent had a heart attack and died while helping with a bag job in one of the Eastern European embassies. And sometimes local police stumbled onto an FBI break-in. When that happened, "You hit the cop and you ran," said one former agent. Said another: "There were some nasty confrontations in back alleys."

Two sources recalled a case ten years ago in which FBI agents had earlier planted a bug in the office of a mob attorney and had "gone back in to juice it up." One agent dropped something that he shouldn't have been carrying anyway—either his credentials or a report with his name

on it—and when the lawyer came in next morning, it was clear the FBI had been there. As the sources recalled it, the agent was fired.

There were cases in which local police concealed the FBI's tracks. More than a decade ago, a former New York City policeman recalled, the FBI broke into the apartment of a Soviet diplomat assigned to the United Nations. As usual, there was an agent on watch in the lobby of the apartment, but the Russian—who had forgotten some theater tickets—somehow returned without being spotted. When he discovered the agents, their only recourse was to pretend that they really were burglars. They hit him, knocked him down and hurriedly ransacked the room. The Russians called the cops, who came to investigate, but later that night the FBI told the detectives not to probe too hard. The detectives were unhappy about it because they had to fill out monthly status reports on the "unsolved" case.

On one occasion, however, the FBI unwittingly helped the New York police. An FBI agent was breaking into the apartment of a mobster while a lookout and a getaway man waited in separate cars. The plan was for the "burglar" to come out and signal to the lookout, who would honk twice; the getaway car would drive up and speed the "burglar" away. "Off they went at 90 miles per hour," said a former agent. "About six blocks away, the driver looks at the passenger and says, 'Who the f— are you?' The passenger looks at the driver and answers, 'Who the f— are you?' The passenger, it seemed, was a police "burglar" whose target was another apartment in the same building—and whose getaway signal was also two honks of a horn.

NEW YORK: MAC the Knife

Two crises ago—as New York reckons time these days—C. Carey and the New York State legislature created the Municipal Corporation to help the Big Apple bankruptcy. That was back in Big Mac, as it was immediately quickly prepared to take on the city's staggering \$6 billion short-term debts. The MAC's long-term bonds of its own—specially earmarked city sale while watching over the treacherous gimmick-ridden City Hall making process. Politicians, urban and financial leaders heave relief—but that proved premature. The city resumed its gimmickry. By a tepid welcome in the bond market and New York was faced last with the most distasteful dose of finance it has yet had to swallow.

Image: With its first \$1 billion issue not completely sold and a billion still to offer, Big Mac Mayor Abe Beame to the City. Only weeks before, Beame had massive layoffs of city work 19,000 of which were still supereffect despite additional tax authorized for the city to help crisis (NEWSWEEK, July 14). painful experience—including day garbage strike—had done more than good to the city's image with investors. Beame was told chairman Thomas D. Flynn board directors. "The Big Mac came back from their road show and discouraged about the city around the country," one said. "They couldn't believe it to the city and its life-style—tuition at City University to capitulation to city unions."

Without Big Mac's bonds.



Beame and Flynn: A matter of pride

DOCUMENT # 3
PART 2

~~SECRET~~
~~TOP SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE: 7-11-90 BJA/ra 8-9-90

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Fulton

~~Classified by 1565~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 6-14-89~~
Appeal 87-2172

JUNE 8

July 25, 1975

~~Classified by 1565~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 6-14-89~~

SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Between the years 1942 to 1967, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) utilized surreptitious entry in cases bearing on the security of the Nation. When a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a field office considered the technique necessary to the conduct of an investigation, he would make his request to the appropriate Assistant Director, justifying need for a surreptitious entry and assuring it could be safely accomplished with full security. In accordance with Director's Hoover's instructions, a memorandum outlining the facts of the request was then prepared for approval of Mr. Tolson, the Associate Director, or Director Hoover. Subsequently, the memorandum was filed in the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File" procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field office, the SAC maintained a record of approval, as a control device, in his office safe. At the next yearly field office inspection, a review would be made of these records by the Inspector to insure that the SAC was not acting without prior Headquarters approval in conducting surreptitious entries. Upon completion of this review, these records were then destroyed. Accordingly, in attempting to now reconstruct those instances of surreptitious entry, FBI Headquarters necessarily had to rely upon search of our indices and the recollection of Special Agents who might have knowledge of such activity.

As a result of our survey, it was determined that surreptitious entry was used against at least ten targets in the domestic area. These targets included [redacted] 1975

groups of the CPUSA, headquarters of the Socialist Workers Party, and in one instance entry into a hotel room registered to three Ku Klux Klan officials. In operations against any of these targets, with the exception of the Klan, a number of [redacted]

- Assoc. Dir.
- Dep. AD Adm.
- Dep. AD Inv.
- Asst. Dir.:
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- Director Sec'y

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Classified by 1575
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT ENCLOSURE

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP4 BML/col
Reason: FCIM II, 1-2.4.2, 1-2.4.3
Date of Review: 7-23-83
7-3-83

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Surreptitious Entry

surreptitious entries would have been made for such purposes as collecting information concerning registration, transfers of members between districts, manner of financing, new membership records, and organizational structure. Surreptitious entries against those targets were always handled under the most secure conditions with every safeguard taken to preclude detection on the part of the target. (X)

During the period 1957 to 1967, surreptitious entry was used against at least 11 foreign intelligence targets [REDACTED] (S)

(411) One target was an individual connected with the Fidel Castro July 26 Movement and another concerned the security of documents pertaining to the July 26 Movement and its members. Another target was a liaison contact between a Puerto Rican independence group [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The final target was an individual in contact with a suspected intelligence agent of the People's Republic of China. Operations against (S) some of these targets called for the use of a number of surreptitious entries to obtain information on such espionage paraphernalia as radio and photographic equipment, secret writing materials, and fraudulent identification papers. (X) (u) (b) (7) (C)

(In July, 1966, Director J. Edgar Hoover ordered discontinuance of the aforementioned technique. In January, 1967, Director Hoover restated his position in a memorandum that he would not authorize use of the surreptitious entry technique.

In connection with the installation of microphone surveillances, surreptitious entry was required in many instances. Prior to March 30, 1965, microphone installation and activation did not require written authority from the Attorney General, but could be effected on FBI Headquarters authority. The Department was aware of this procedure as evidenced by a memorandum from former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, dated May 20, 1954, which recognized FBI authority to institute such surveillances.

By memorandum to the Attorney General dated March 30, 1965, Director Hoover stated that the FBI would begin requesting Attorney General authority for the place

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Surreptitious Entry

ment of microphones. By memorandum dated September 27, 1965, the Attorney General referred to microphones involving trespass and confirmed his understanding that such microphones would not be used without his authorization.

A recent FBI survey determined that during the period January, 1967, to March, 1975, the Attorney General authorized operation of 172 microphone surveillances.

Prior to September, 1974, surveys to determine if a microphone surveillance would be feasible at a particular location were authorized by FBI Headquarters. Some of these feasibility surveys involved trespass. Where a microphone installation was considered feasible, authority for operation of the surveillance was obtained from the Attorney General. Since September, 1974, the FBI has followed a policy of requesting authority of the Attorney General to conduct these feasibility surveys. Since that time, the Attorney General has authorized surveys and installations on 23 occasions.

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General, dated 7/25/75, captioned "Surreptitious Entry," prepared by [REDACTED]

67/C

~~TOP SECRET~~

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XXXXXXFEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Section 552Section 552a☒ (b)(1)☐ (b)(7)(A)☐ (d)(5)☐ (b)(2)☐ (b)(7)(B)☐ (j)(2)☐ (b)(3)☒ (b)(7)(C)☐ (k)(1)☐ (b)(7)(D)☐ (k)(2)☐ (b)(7)(E)☐ (k)(3)☐ (b)(7)(F)☐ (k)(4)☐ (b)(4)☐ (b)(8)☐ (k)(5)☐ (b)(5)☐ (b)(9)☐ (k)(6)☐ (b)(6)☐ (k)(7)

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62-117166-X1 PAGE 1

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

NOTE:

See letter to Attorney General dated 7/25/75, captioned, "Surreptitious Entry" prepared by [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PART 4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Fulton

July 25, 1975

Classified by 1865
Declassify on: OADR 6-14-89

APPR 89 2172

JUNE 1989

(611)

~~SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY~~

Class. & Ext. by SP4 SEM
Reason-NCIM 11-2.4.2
Date of Review 3-3

As early as 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation was engaged in surreptitious entry in the United States to develop information necessary for, and at the requests of, the War and Navy Departments, and for the information of the Department of State. During this period,

After the close of World War II and during the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe,

During the periods outlined above, files concerning surreptitious entries were highly compartmentalized because of their extremely sensitive nature, and recovery of the full details of each and every instance is virtually impossible.

Beginning in February, 1954, and continuing to January, 1967, the FBI conducted a program involving surreptitious entry in the United States

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)
DATE 03-11-75
Classified by 1865
Declassify on: OADR 6-14-89

Classified by 4375

Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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TOP SECRET - COINT

SEE NOTE PAGE

71C
Comp. Syst.
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Ident.
Intell.
Lab.
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Insp.
Rec. Mgmt.
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UNCLASSIFIED

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~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~

~~Surreptitious Entry~~ [REDACTED] (S) (b)(1)

(S) Organizational chart attached.)

(b)(1) We furnished the then Attorney General the product of these operations by letters dated November 9, 1954, December 15, 1954, July 8, 1955, and October 19, 1955. In addition, Mr. Hoover briefed the Attorney General on March 1, 1955, at which time the Attorney General was so impressed he suggested a meeting between himself, Mr. Hoover, and the President to advise the President of our successes. Briefing books were prepared; however, we are unable to date to determine if such a briefing of the President took place. In addition, on two occasions, high level State Department officials were briefed as well as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which was briefed on April 23, 1963. [REDACTED] (S)

(b)(1) A review of material prepared for Mr. Hoover's budget testimony before Congress in 1967 reveals a rundown on our program activities, which information was to be used in off-the-record testimony. We have no way of documenting that the information was actually used; however, it is the recollection of one of the program supervisors that the point was raised by a member of the Congressional Committee before which Mr. Hoover appeared, that if we were [REDACTED] (S)

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~~SECRET~~

properly classified
per letter dated
11/10/64
Approved for

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET - COMINT~~

~~Surreptitious Entry~~ [REDACTED] (S)

(411)

(411) Since Mr. Hoover discontinued our participation in the program in January, 1967, we have received a number of requests from the [REDACTED] to reinstitute this program.

enclosure

NOTE:

See letter to the Attorney General, dated 7/25/75, captioned "Surreptitious Entry," prepared by [REDACTED]

(2101)

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~~SECRET~~

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COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
(N. S. C.)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(Executive Agent of Government for the Production of Comint Information)

N. S. C. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON COMINT
(Secretary State, Secretary Defense, Attorney General)
(CIA and FBI assisting)

Policy Control

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
(Produces Comint Information)

U. S. COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD
(Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, FBI, State, Defense, National Security Agency)

Class. & Ext. By SP4 Jm/cal
Reason-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2.3
Date of Review 7-25-83
613-82

U. S. C. I. B. EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Army, Navy, Air Force, CIA, Defense, State, FBI, National Security Agency)

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INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEE

SECURITY
COMMITTEE

U. S. C. I. B. - UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD

COMINT - COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

~~TOP SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

Classified by SP4 Jm/cal
Declassify on: OADR
5/20/83

62-117166-X1

62-8160-3722

~~SECRET~~

DOCUMENT # 3
~~SECRET~~ PART 5

- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Mintz
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Fulton

Classified by 1563
Declassify on OADR 6-14-89
Appeal 87-2172

JUNE

July 25, 1975

~~X~~ SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY SINCE 1967 ~~X~~ (U)

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OTHERWISE

In 1967, based on information received by the

REI [REDACTED]

No surreptitious entry into a premises was (S)
conducted. (S)

During the period April, 1968, to August, 1968,
seven surreptitious entries were made

A microphone surveillance, authorized by (S)
the Attorney General, was installed in March, 1968. The
purpose for the installation and the entries was to determine
our subjects' assignments and communication procedures to
negate their intelligence assignments in the United States.
Discovered during entries were sensitive photographic
equipment, two walkie-talkies, a transistor radio capable
of receiving shortwave broadcasts, numerous maps of areas
on the Eastern Coast of the United States, and a special
notebook believed to relate to geographic locations of
apparent intelligence assignments. (S)

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CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED

DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRC)

8-9-90
7-11-90
Class. & Ext. By SP5 JF/1/col
Reason: FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
Date of Review 7-8-95

- Asst. Dir. _____
- Dep. AD Adm. _____
- Dep. AD Inv. _____
- Asst. Dir. _____
- Admin. _____
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- Director Sec'y _____

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Classified by [REDACTED]
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

MAIL ROOM

TELETYPE UNIT

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(S) Surreptitious Entry Since 1967 (X)(U)

(4)(1) In September, 1970, a surreptitious entry and microphone installation authorized by the Attorney General was made [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the (S) entry, a shortwave radio receiver with earphones, Communist Party and historical Russian books published in the USSR, and general address and telephone books, as well as miscellaneous records were observed. (X)

(4)(1) In September, 1972, surveys were conducted by the FBI to determine the feasibility of microphone installations [REDACTED] (S)

[REDACTED] (S) A trespass was necessary to make these entries, as well as a later entry in September, 1972, when a microphone approved by Attorney General Richard Kleindienst was emplaced in [REDACTED] (S)

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Surreptitious Entry Since 1967 (S)(u)

In August, 1974, three surreptitious entries were conducted

one entry was (S) for the purpose of locating espionage paraphernalia; the second was for survey and installation of a microphone surveillance; the third entry concerned technical problems relating to the microphone surveillance previously emplaced, as well as an attempt to locate espionage paraphernalia. (S)

The above information was compiled from a review of available records at FBI Headquarters and recollections of Special Agents assigned at Headquarters.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL
(6117XC)

JUNE

- 1 - Mr. Gallagher
 - 1 - Mr. O'Connell
 - 1 - Mr. Cooke
 - 1 - [REDACTED]
 - 1 - Mr. Adams
- July 25, 1975

SURREPTITIOUS ENTRY

"The New York Times" edition of July 20, 1975, on page E2, contains an article captioned "The F.B.I.'s Record on Break-Ins." According to the article, the FBI perpetrated break-ins in investigating ordinary cases of bank robbery, kidnapping, and hijacking in addition to those involving "national security."

The General Investigative Division (GID) at FBI Headquarters has the responsibility for supervising investigative matters of substantive Federal violations within FBI investigative jurisdiction in all cases including Bank Robbery, Kidnapping, and Hijacking except those involving violations of the Fugitive Felon Act, Organized Crime and Internal Security matters. It does supervise some matters involving anti-racketeering which might fall into an organized crime category. The GID does not now have nor has it ever established any program(s) involving "surreptitious entry" as an investigative technique. Likewise, officials currently assigned to the GID have no knowledge of any instances wherein a surreptitious entry was utilized in the investigation of matters handled by the GID.

It is noted, however, that there have been occasions, where pursuant to a court authorized interception of oral communications by use of concealed microphones, appropriate entry necessary for the installation of said microphones was made into private premises. These entries are considered legal and proper.

NOTE: Original and 1 copy disseminated by cover letter to the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division dated 7-25-75, captioned as above [REDACTED]

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DATE 3-3-92 BY SP-10/ML

- Assoc. Dir. _____
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- Director Sec'y _____

101
62-107166-22 PM
66-8160-3723
ENCLOSURE FILE

The Attorney General

July 25, 1975

Director, FBI

JUNG

- 1 - Mr. Adams
- 1 - Mr. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland
- 1 - Mr. McCarthy

"NEWSWEEK" ARTICLE
JULY 28, 1975,
"THE FBI'S BLACK BAG BOYS"

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

Surreptitious Entries

EX-101

REC 21

An article appearing in "Newsweek" July 28, 1975, alluded to a number of surreptitious entries engaged in by the FBI from the 1940's until 1968. While general in nature, this article referred to several specific cases involving our investigations in both the security and organized crime fields. The writer related a set of facts concerning entry made in an attorney's office at which time Agents supposedly left behind certain evidence which identified the persons making entry as being with the FBI. It is felt that the situation referred to concerns our investigation of [redacted] a Miami attorney. There is attached a separate communication setting forth the complete facts relating to the [redacted] situation.

At one point in the article the writer made reference to problems encountered by the Agents while conducting surreptitious entries and referred to a situation in which entry was made into "mob headquarters" for the purpose of planting a microphone. During this entry an Agent supposedly "thrust his foot through the ceiling." We are unable to locate any record of such an occurrence taking place.

We are unable to locate any record of a breaking in at a mob office in Brooklyn, New York, as stated in the article.

Knowledgeable representatives of the Special Investigative Division are aware of no surreptitious entries made by the FBI in any criminal field other than those conducted to install electronic surveillance equipment, which had been duly authorized.

- Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURE
- 1 - The Deputy Attorney General
 - 1 - Assistant Attorney General

Assoc. Dir. _____
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Director Sec'y _____


AUG 1 1975

AUG 5 1975

66-8160-392
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-3-82 BY SPURM/CJ
(11) 110

The Attorney General

NOTE: The foregoing is to acquaint the Attorney General with the true facts concerning certain entries made in the organized crime field relating to the installation of microphones. Intelligence Division, by separate communication, has explained those aspects of the article relating to security matters.



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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Moore

DATE: 8/30/76

FROM : H. A. Boynton, Jr.

SUBJECT: "WASHINGTON STAR" ARTICLE CONCERNING
BLACK BAG JOBS, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

Assoc. Dir. _____
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Director Sec'y _____

PURPOSE

This memorandum is being prepared in view of the Director's comments relating to the "Washington Star" article of August 26, 1976, which alleged that the Director while SAC in Birmingham, Alabama, during the period of 1957-1960 requested authority from FBI Headquarters for a break-in.

DETAILS

The "Washington Star" article of August 26th written by staff writer Jerry Oppenheimer disclosed that a source who formerly held a high position in the Bureau said that the Director had approved the request for a break-in in Birmingham, Alabama, during the period of 1957-1960. The External Affairs Division after conferring with the Director informed Oppenheimer that the Director could not recall requesting the surreptitious entry while he was SAC at Birmingham; however, the Director indicated that if he did have such a recollection he would have no hesitancy in admitting it.

The fifth paragraph of the article indicated, "Break-ins were among the investigative techniques used by the bureau during Cointelpro--a concerted effort to harass, discredit and disrupt organizations that were considered threats to the country. Cointelpro was ended in 1971."

Next to this paragraph the Director indicated, "Why did we not comment on this?" Oppenheimer was not furnished a comment concerning this paragraph because the External Affairs Division was not informed by Oppenheimer that he was going to include such information in the article. **ST-114** **DE-8** **94-8-24**
The External Affairs Division was not aware of this paragraph until after publication of the article.

RECOMMENDATION

For information.

ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Moore

(2)

APPROVED: **RE**
Assoc. Dir. _____
Dep. AD Adm. _____
Dep. AD Inv. _____
Asst. Dir.: _____
Adm. Serv. _____

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5 OCT 12 1976

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KELLEY ASKED BREAK-IN OK AS AGENT

Acted as Head Of FBI Office In Birmingham

By Jerry Oppenheimer

Washington Star Staff Writer

FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley, while serving as special agent in charge of the Birmingham, Ala., field office in the late 1950s, requested authorization from Washington headquarters for at least one break-in, according to a knowledgeable source.

The source, who formerly held a high position in the bureau, said that Kelley approved the request for authorization that went to headquarters, based on a recommendation from the agent heading the investigation.

The source said he could not recall the investigative reason for the surreptitious entry request from the Birmingham office. But he said it was made between December 1957 and November 1960 when Kelley was special agent in charge there.

ONE REASON FOR the request, a bureau official speculated yesterday, could have been that in 1956, about a year before Kelley took over the Birmingham office, the FBI initiated its controversial counterintelligence operation, Cointelpro. Its first target was the Communist party-U.S.A., and the official speculated that the Birmingham office might have been investigating a Communist group in the area. The FBI was also active against the Ku Klux Klan during that period.

Break-ins were among the investigative techniques used by the bureau during Cointelpro — a concerted effort to harass, discredit and disrupt organizations that were considered threats to the country. Cointelpro was ended in 1971.

Kelley, through a bureau spokesman, did not deny the source's assertion yesterday, but said he could "not recall" requesting a surreptitious entry while serving in Birmingham. But, Kelley emphasized, "If I did have a recollection I would have no hesitancy in admitting it."

At the time of the alleged request, the source said, Kelley was "wholeheartedly in favor" of break-ins as an investigative technique in intelligence investigations. He was a

*Why did we not
 comment on this?*

The Washington Post _____
 Washington Star-News RI
 Daily News (New York) _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The National Observer _____
 The Los Angeles Times _____

Date AUG 26 1976

*Article
 Washington
 Star
 8/16/76*

*bagged to Wase
 5/30/76 NAB/og*

94-8-24-1024

ENCLOSURE

traditionalist. He never objected to those techniques when he was a SAC.

The source said that, during his time in the bureau, "there never was a special agent in charge who didn't understand and approve of surreptitious entries. No one ever complained, they all approved. Kelley was fully cognizant of those operations and he approved."

THE ASSERTION by the former bureau official concerning Kelley's past activities is the first that links the director to the past abuses instituted and authorized by the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

Hoover ostensibly ended the use of surreptitious entries in 1966, but the Justice Department is now probing break-ins carried out by agents in 1972 and 1973.

For the period prior to 1966, few if any records are believed to exist that could prove or disprove Kelley's alleged involvement in requesting authorization for a break-in.

Standard procedure at the time was to destroy all documents relating to surreptitious entries within a year. Within that year, according to findings of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the "Do Not File" procedure called for holding the records in the office safes of special agents in charge.

A bureau official, discussing the source's assertion that Kelley requested a break-in, said:

"In those days, prior to 1966, all of the people in the field (including Kelley) felt that if Hoover authorized it (break-ins), he got authority from higher up, such as an attorney general. They (agents) thus felt it to be a legal and valuable technique."

The Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that there was no indication that any attorney general was informed of the so-called "black bag jobs."

WITH KELLEY identified as having allegedly requested approval for a break-in, the two top officials of the

beleaguered bureau have been linked to what are considered to be the wrongful past abuses of power authorized during the Hoover reign.

Richard G. Held, named by Kelley last month as the bureau's No. 2 man, headed the Minneapolis field office in the late 1960s and early 1970s when that office targeted Cointelpro activities against groups there.

As a result of news reports concerning those activities, Held issued a statement accepting responsibility for all actions "good or bad" that flowed from the office. But Held emphasized that, "I was not in any decision-making positions when this program was instituted, nor did I direct it while the program (Cointelpro) was active."

He laid the blame for any possible wrongdoing on headquarters officials who "instituted and directed" Cointelpro and contended that "it was our responsibility to implement" it.


It was understood yesterday that Kelley, who was said to have approved Held's statement, takes a similar view for any such activities in which he was involved while serving in the field for 21 years before retiring from the bureau in Oct. 1961. After serving as chief of the Kansas City police department, he returned to the bureau as director in 1973, a year after Hoover died.

KELLEY HAS NEVER acknowledged participating in break-ins while serving in the field. "I'm not saying that Clarence Kelley engaged in such activities or did not engage in these activities," he said at a July 14 press conference.

But Kelley characterized the areas in which surreptitious entries were used prior to 1966 as those involving counterintelligence or national security.

Earlier this year Kelley publicly apologized for past FBI misdeeds and subtly criticized Hoover for allowing the abuses. But Kelley did not list the activities he considered wrong.

Kelley consistently maintained until the 1972-73 break-ins came to light that such activities ended with Hoover's 1966 directive. Earlier this month, however, Kelley charged that he had been deliberately "deceived" by aides who withheld from him knowledge of the later break-ins.



—Associated Press
FBI Director Clarence M. Kelley says he cannot recall asking bureau permission in the late 1950s to conduct an investigative break-in.